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I. Introduction
Thank you so much for having me. This is such a wonderful
conference, and I am so excited to see the area of overlap between
tax and poverty becoming its own field of study. The fact that we
are all here today to talk about tax and poverty is in fact just more
evidence of the growing extent to which the federal government
relies on tax tools to fight poverty. When using the tax code against
poverty started, when the EITC first took root decades ago, the tax
anti-poverty programs supplemented direct-spending programs
like welfare and food stamps.1 As those programs have contracted,
and as the tax antipoverty programs expanded, in terms of the
* Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development, Associate
Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School and Affiliate, Institute for
Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Thanks to Michelle Lyon
Drumbl and the student organizers of this symposium for convening this event
and to Chas Camic, Carey Seal and Alex Tahk for helpful comments.
1. See John Karl Scholz, Robert Moffitt & Benjamin Cowan, Trends in
Income Support, in CHANGING POVERTY, CHANGING POLICIES 203–41, 232 (2009)
(discussing historical data on social insurance and antipoverty spending by
program in the 1970–2007 period).
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numbers of recipients and the generosity of the relevant legislative
provisions, the tax antipoverty provisions have become more
important to the nation’s antipoverty agenda: Bigger in scale and
higher in visibility.2
The question that I want to talk about today: To what extent
do the particular advantages of the tax antipoverty programs
persist as the tax antipoverty programs take center stage? Can tax
programs, once distinguished from their direct-spending
counterparts on the grounds of relative popularity and legal and
administrative ease of access maintain those hallmarks as the
tax-based welfare state grows in size and scope?3 The first of the
tax antipoverty programs was the EITC, a small, nimble program
easily administered on a tax return, often meant to encourage
2. See generally Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, The Earned Income Tax
Credit: A Brief Legislative History, Congressional Research Service, in CONG. RES.
SERV. (Mar. 20, 2018) (“After various legislative changes over the past 40 years,
the credit is now one of the federal government’s largest antipoverty programs.
Since the EITC’s enactment, Congress has shown increasing interest in using
refundable tax credits for a variety of purposes.”) For data on the EITC’s size in
recent years relative to other federal antipoverty programs, see Karen Spar &
Gene Falk, Federal Benefits and Services for People with Low Income: Overview
of Spending Trends, FY2008-FY2015, in CONG. RES. SERV., 9 (July 29, 2016).
3. See generally Susannah Camic Tahk, Everything is Tax, 50 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 67 (2013). For arguments about the administrative ease of programs run
through the tax code, see id. at 101–04; Susannah Camic Tahk, The Tax War on
Poverty, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 791, 829–32 (2014); Nancy Staudt, Redundant Tax and
Spending Programs, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1197, 1223 (2006); David A. Weisbach,
Tax Expenditures, Principal-Agent Problems, and Redundancy, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 1823, 1830–42 (2006); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration
of Tax and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1010–12 (2004). For
arguments about relative popularity, see Conor Clarke, New Research on the
Stubborn Persistence of Tax Expenditures, 150 TAX NOTES 1462 (2016); Conor
Clarke & Edward Fox, Note, Perceptions of Tax Expenditures and Direct Outlays:
A Survey Experiment, 124 YALE L.J. 1252 (2015); Christopher Faricy &
Christopher Ellis, Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the United States:
The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures, 36 POL. BEHAV.
53 (2013); Jake Haselswerdt & Brandon Bartels, Public Opinion, Policy Tools,
and the Status Quo: Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 68 POL. RES. Q. 607
(2015). For further reading, see also Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures
Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the
Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REV. 797, 799 (2005) (finding
that participants in a survey experiment were less likely to view property tax
exemptions, as opposed to direct subsidies, as interfering with volunteer
firefighters’ status as volunteers).
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people who might otherwise be receiving welfare to go to work.4
Now, the EITC at the foundation of our federal antipoverty
apparatus.5 What are the consequences? How much have the EITC
and its now-lengthy list of companion tax antipoverty programs,
retained the advantages of the supplemental welfare state it once
was? Or, instead, are the tax antipoverty programs starting to
resemble the behemoth direct-spending programs they’ve replaced
in the center of the U.S.’s social policy landscape? To what extent
can we expect tax programs become more like direct-spending
programs, or “welfare” over time? That’s the question I want to
consider in this talk: Will the trajectories of the tax antipoverty
programs and the direct-spending programs converge?
My goal here to take seriously potential threats that emerge
from relying on the tax code as the primary federal means to
accomplish antipoverty goals? To talk about this question, I want
to focus on three ways that tax antipoverty programs have differed
from their direct-spending counterparts and consider how each
might change as the tax programs grow in scale and salience. First,
I will discuss public opinion, second, legal frameworks, namely the
fact that the tax programs are in the Internal Revenue Code and
the non-tax ones are not, and third, administration. I will then
offer a few concluding reflections on the normative implications of
these differences and their possible persistence.
II. Public Opinion
First, I want to look the relative popularity of the tax
antipoverty programs. In my past work, I’ve written about the
growing body of evidence that tax antipoverty programs are
substantially more popular than their direct-spending
counterparts.6 A commenter on a paper of mine one said that
4. See Crandall-Hollick, supra note 2, at 2–4 (discussing the various
characteristics of the EITC).
5. See Spar & Falk, supra note 2, at 9 (characterizing the EITC as one of
the federal government’s “top four” programs for people with low incomes).
6. See Tahk (2014), supra note 3, at 829–32 (“While conventional wisdom
might suggest that the poor do not know to file tax returns and for that reason
miss out on available benefits, data reveal that the take-up rates, at least for the
EITC, are substantially higher than for nontax welfare programs.”); see also
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tax-based anti-poverty programs are “statism for anti-statists;”
they take something unpopular: Welfare, and repackage it in the
anti-statist trappings of tax benefits.7 In this way, they make
welfare policy more palatable to the public, to political leaders and
to beneficiaries.8 We see this in both what has happened to the tax
antipoverty programs and the way people view them, each of which
I will now discuss.
What has happened: The tax anti-poverty programs continue
to be popular enough with political elites so as to enable their
growth. Most recently, take the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, passed by
two Republican-controlled houses of Congress and signed by
President Trump.9 While not enhancing the EITC, the bill did not
cut it, either, and of course did substantially expand the child tax
credit,10 including lowering the earned income threshold.11 In fall
2018 in Wisconsin, a new child credit was one of the signature
plans in the midterm election from Republican governor, Scott
Walker.12
Clarke supra note 3, at 1463–64(discussing how “[t]he public consistently prefers
spending through the tax code to spending outside of it”); Clarke & Fox, supra
note 3, at 1279–82 (discussing “some limitations and hypotheses that we hope will
provide a basis for future research on why taxpayers prefer spending through the
tax code”); Faricy & Ellis, supra note 3, at 6 (discussing “why citizens support or
oppose particular social spending programs”); Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note
3, at 615–19 (discussing an “experimental study [that] makes an important
contribution to our understanding of citizen preferences regarding government
programs”).
7. Thanks to Ajay Mehrotra for this point.
8. Thanks to Ajay Mehrotra for this point.
9. For votes on this bill, see 163 CONG. REC. H10214 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
2017); 163 CONG REC. S8141–42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2017). For President Trump’s
signing statement, see Remarks by President Trump at Signing of H.R. 1, Tax
Cuts and Jobs Bill Act, and H.R. 1370 (Dec. 22, 2017), available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trumpsigning-h-r-1-tax-cuts-jobs-bill-act-h-r-1370/.
10. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”) § 11022(a), I.R.C. § 24 (2018)
(increasing and modifying the child tax credit).
11. See id. (same)
12. See Walker Proposes New Child Tax Credit, WIS. RADIO NETWORK (Sep.
24, 2018), https://wsau.com/news/articles/2018/sep/24/walker-proposes-newchild-tax-credit/ (discussing Scott Walker’s “proposal to provide a new child care
tax credit) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
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On the subject of public opinion, a spate of published studies
in the past few years has consistently found that people are more
likely to support tax-embedded social programs than their non-tax
counterparts.13 Researchers have found this to be true across policy
areas.14
The question on the public opinion side then becomes, to what
extent will the tax credits remain relatively popular as they
become more central to the country’s antipoverty agenda? Welfare
and other direct-spending programs were historically unpopular,15
which is perhaps one reason why we do not have Aid to Families
with Dependent Children anymore,16 and may be part of why
enrollment in these programs continues to decline.17 Can we expect
the same thing to happen to the tax antipoverty programs?
The answer to that depends on why the tax antipoverty
programs were relatively popular in the first place. Unfortunately,
we do not yet have much empirical evidence to help us sort this
out. I want to talk a bit about my different hypotheses and what

13. See Clarke, supra note 3, at 1463–64 (discussing why “[t]he public
believes tax expenditures are cheaper than equivalent spending program”);
Clarke & Fox, supra note 3, at 1279–82 (discussing why taxpayers prefer
spending through the tax code); Faricy & Ellis, supra note 3, at 70–71 (“Both
Republicans and Democrats support the mortgage interest and retirement
programs less when they are framed as direct payments rather than tax credits.”);
Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 3, at 615–19 (discussing the data pertaining
to why taxpayers prefer spending through tax programs).
14. See Clarke & Fox, supra note 3, at 1277–78 (finding this preference in
the case of homeownership subsidies); Faricy & Ellis, supra note 3, at 64 (finding
it in the case of retirement-saving and homeownership subsidies); Haselswerdt &
Bartels, supra note 3, at 612 (finding it in the case of homeownership,
parental-leave and job-training subsidies).
15. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE 26 (1999)
(explaining data that “support the popular impression that Americans are
uniquely hostile toward, or at least uniquely unsupportive of, government
responsibility for social welfare”).
16. See id. at 24–25 (discussing the influence of public opinion on
development of the welfare state).
17. See Gene Falk, The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
Block Grant: Responses to Frequently Asked Questions, in CONG. RES. SERV. 5 (Jan.
28, 2019) (analyzing “a long-term historical perspective on the number of families
receiving assistance from TANF or its predecessor program, from July 1959 to
September 2017”).
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each implies for the potential future trajectory of the tax-based
welfare state. I will call them hypotheses A, B and C.
Hypothesis A is about work. It says, the tax antipoverty
programs are relatively more popular than their direct-spending
counterparts because the tax programs involve work. The tax
antipoverty programs either are explicitly linked to earned
income,18 or have earned income thresholds19 or, in the case of more
indirect tax antipoverty programs like the low-income housing
credit, they are for business taxpayers who presumably have tax
liability against which to offset the credits.20 When I present data
on the tax program’s public-opinion advantage, the fact that tax
antipoverty programs require recipients to work is probably the
hypothesis is always the first one that audiences suggest.
However, that story has to be a little more complicated,
especially now that the tax benefits’ relative place in the
antipoverty landscape is changing. Lots of direct-spending
antipoverty programs including temporary assistance to needy
families21 and food stamps do now explicitly mandate work,22 and
18. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 21(a)(1) (2018) (requiring that expenses eligible for the
child care credit be “employment-related”); see also, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 32(a)(1),
(c)(2)(A) (2018) (specifying that the EITC requires earned income and then
defining earned income as income from work).
19. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 24(d)(1)(B)(i) (2018), (h)(6) (2018) (setting the
refundability threshold, then lowering it from $3000 to $2500 for the years 2018–
2025).
20. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 38 (b)(6), (10) (14) (2018) (identifying the low-income
housing credit, the empowerment zone employment credit and the new markets
tax credit as parts of the general business credit, which is nonrefundable and, by
definition, only able to be offset against tax liability).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (explaining the requirements for an
individual in a 2-parent family to be considered as engaged in work for a month
for a fiscal year).
22. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, PUB. L. NO. 104-193, § 815, 110 Stat. 2278 (amending sec. 6(d) of the Food
and Agriculture Act of 1977 to disqualify from receiving food stamps able-bodied
adults without dependents who refuse to register for employment, participate in
an employment or training program, or accept an offer of employment). In
addition, many states have additional work requirements for food stamp
recipients. For instance, six states disqualify the entire household from receiving
food stamps if the head of household fails to comply with work requirements. See
Snap Work Requirements Fact Sheet, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS.,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/snap-work-requirements-factsheet.aspx#2018%20Legislation (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (analyzing 2018 state
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have for more than 20 years.23 While the EITC has earned income
in its name, I am not sure how many people know that the child
tax credit has an implicit work requirement in the form of the
earned income threshold. Further, at this point, the threshold is
low enough that it is a much less stringent work provision than the
direct-spending programs have.24 Commentators might reply,
people think the tax programs lean more heavily on work rules
than welfare does. The public may think that, but the fact that it
is not true anymore just raises the question, what is it about the
tax programs that makes the public think they necessarily require
work? And more importantly for this talk, would people keep
thinking that if, for instance, Congress did lower the earned
income threshold of the child tax credit to five dollars, or to 0? Will
people always associate tax-embedded social policy with work?
How non-work-oriented can the tax credits become without losing
their work halo? If strong work associations are what makes the
tax antipoverty programs particularly popular, how enduring that
popularity will be would depend on how strong those associations
are, and whether they can withstand the potential decreasing
relative importance of work to some of the tax programs.
legislation regarding work requirements) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
23. See the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, P.L. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105, (setting up TANF and adding work requirements for food stamps;
was passed on August 22, 1996).
24. An earned income threshold means that the recipient of the credit must
have at least $2,500 of earned income to take the credit. To see how this
calculation works, see Conf. Rept. No. 108-696 P.L. 108-311, 34; Conf. Rept. No.
107-84. P.L. 107-16, 133. Current SNAP law requires, in essence, able-bodied
adults to work 30 hours a week or enroll in a comparable work training program
or school. See Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, §§ 4001–4407
(describing the Food Stamp Program and its requirements); see also 7 C.F.R.
§ 273.24 (same). For a summary of these requirements, see United States Dep’t.
of Agric., Food and Nutrition Service, in SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM— CLARIFICATIONS ON WORK REQUIREMENTS, ABA WDs, and E&T (May
2018),
https://fns-prod.azureedge.net/sites/default/files/snap/Clarifications-onWorkRequirements-ABAWDs-ET-May2018.pdf (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). At the federal minimum wage of
$7.25/hour, the earned income threshold of $2,500 amounts to a requirement that
the child credit recipient work only 7 hours a week. In addition, none of the SNAP
law about what counts as work, or whether this work get done over the course of
a year or in a few weeks, applies to the child credit, which merely requires the
recipient to earn $2,500, however the person would like to do it.
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My second hypothesis as to why the tax anti-poverty programs
are relatively popular, Hypothesis B, posits tax programs are
relatively popular because they are framed as tax cuts, as reducing
people’s taxes. The story of hypothesis B goes: Conventional
wisdom holds that taxes are not popular,25 so anything that
purports to lower tax burdens gains a public opinion advantage.
That advantage would among both people who take themselves
take advantage of the credits and people who do not. With regard
to the recipients themselves, the tax-credit framing may be part of
why even low-income recipients of tax antipoverty programs report
experiencing less stigma around the tax benefits than around
welfare benefits.26 With regard to people who themselves do not
take the credits, some of the relative popularity of the tax credits
may come from the idea that, even if the person herself is not
seeing her taxes go down with something like the EITC, someone,
somewhere, is getting a tax cut.
A couple of possible complicating facts for hypothesis B: One,
there is new research including Vanessa Williamson’s recent book
on the topic, showing that taxes may not be as unpopular as
conventional wisdom holds.27 According to Williamson’s research,
Americans in fact like paying taxes and are proud to do so.28 As a
result, they may not in fact place particular value on tax cuts.
Another complicating fact for hypothesis 2: Refundable credits are
also popular relative to direct-spending programs.29 The most
common explanation I have heard used to be: That is because
25. See VANESSA S. WILLIAMSON, READ MY LIPS: WHY AMERICANS ARE PROUD
PAY TAXES ix–xi (2017) (describing the “truism” that Americans hate paying
taxes).
26. See Tahk (2014), supra note 3, at 828 (comparing the social stigma
surrounding recipients of tax benefits versus welfare benefits); see also Laura
Tach & Sarah Halpern-Meekin, Tax Code Knowledge and Behavioral Responses
Among EITC Recipients: Policy Insights from Qualitative Data, 33 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 413 (2014) (“[B]uild[ing] on the robust quantitative literature
on behavioral responses to the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC).”); Jonathan B.
Forman, Let’s Keep (and Expand Upon) the Earned Income Credit, 56 TAX NOTES
233, 233 (1992) (analyzing the EITC).
27. See generally Williamson, supra note 25.
28. See, e.g., id. at 44, 165 (describing interviews about the things surveyed
individuals like about paying taxes).
29. See Clarke & Fox , supra note 3, at 1276–78 (discussing a survey of
preferences for receiving direct subsidies relative to tax credits).
TO
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people do not understand that refundable credits are in fact
government outlays. However, lack of understanding cannot be the
full story. In their study, researchers Conor Clarke and Edward
Fox found that people’s preference for the refundable credits, in
the study’s words, “did not change when they were given clear
information about the mechanics of the tax expenditure. Even
when respondents were given explicit information about what a
refundable credit is, their preference for the tax programs over the
direct-spending ones persisted.”30
If nonetheless, hypothesis B is the right answer, and the tax
antipoverty programs are relatively popular because they are
framed as tax cuts, that advantage is likely to be an enduring one.
Benefits received through the tax code are set up as reducing
people’s tax liability.31 However, it is possible that despite the
Clarke and Fox finding, people will catch on to increased use of
refundability as a policy design feature and come to grapple more
seriously with the fact that tax anti-poverty programs are not
always tax cuts. On the other hand, the more that policymakers
experiment with alternatives like refundability against payroll
taxes, the more persistent the effect of the tax-cut frame might
be.32
The Clarke and Fox finding also poses a challenge to a
competing hypothesis of mine, hypothesis C, coming from Suzanne
Mettler’s work on the submerged state. My Hypothesis C is that
the tax programs are popular relative to welfare because they are
hiding under the tax code’s giant blanket. In Mettler’s terms, tax
30. Id. at 1287.
31. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 21(a)(1) (2018) (regarding married individuals filing
joint returns and surviving spouses); (24)(a)(1) (regarding the child tax credit); 32
(a)(1) (providing examples of provisions providing for credits against tax liability);
62(a) (allowing taxpayers the benefit of “above-the-line” deductions); 63(b)
(allowing taxpayers the benefit of the standard deduction); 63(d) (listing the other
“itemized” deductions that may benefit taxpayers).
32. See, e.g., Marco Rubio, Analysis: Tax Relief for Working Families Hinges
on Child Tax Credit Expansion, MARCO RUBIO, U.S. SENATOR FOR FLORIDA,
https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/10/analysis-tax-relief-forworking-families-hinges-on-child-tax-credit-expansion (last visited Feb. 14, 2019)
(discussing the release of an “analysis showing an enhanced child tac credit
remains the best way to provide meaningful tax relief for working American
families”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
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benefits are “submerged” in the tax code, which obscures the
programs’ true natures as government spending programs and
dooms any future effort at direct expenditures.33 For this reason,
tax-embedded social policy is a “policy terrain that presents
immense obstacles to reform itself and to the public’s perception of
its success.”34 To her, tax antipoverty programs are part of a
“submerged state . . . [that] eludes most ordinary citizens: they
have little awareness of its policies or their upwardly
redistributive effects, and few are cognizant of what is at stake in
reform efforts.”35 A more upbeat spin on hypothesis C comes from
the commenter I quoted earlier as saying, tax anti-poverty
programs are “statism for anti-statists,” allowing the government
to hide otherwise unpopular welfare using this one neat trick.36
What would Hypothesis C mean for how likely tax antipoverty
programs’ relative popularity is to persist? This hypothesis
suggests that the increased scale and salience of the tax-based
welfare state is in fact a serious threat. If tax antipoverty programs
are popular because they are submerged, as they start to surface,
becoming bigger and more visible, they should become relatively
less popular. To take a minor but recent example, just two weeks
ago, Senator Harris proposed a bill called the LIFT the Middle
Class Act, which included a new refundable tax credit of up to $500
a month for families earning less than $100,000 a year.37 In
response, conservative commentator Ben Shapiro tweeted, “[T]his
isn’t a tax plan at all, but simply cutting checks to people who pay
33. SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT
POLICIES UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 32 (2011).
34. Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of
Social Policy Reform in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 803, 803 (2010).
35. Id.
36. Supra note 7.
37. See Kamala D. Harris, Harris Proposes Bold Relief for Families Amid
Rising Costs of Living, KAMALA D. HARRIS, U.S. SENATOR FOR CALIFORNIA,
https://www.harris.senate.gov/news/press-releases/harris-proposes-bold-relieffor-families-amid-rising-costs-of-living (last visited Feb. 14, 2019) (“Today, U.S.
Senator Kamala D. Harris announced the LIFT (Livable Incomes for Families
Today) the Middle Class Act, legislation to provide middle class and working
families with a tax credit of up to $6,000 a year—or up to $500 a month—to
address the rising cost of living.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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little or no income tax in the first place.”38 Seven thousand people
liked or retweeted the observation.39 If that reaction continued to
take hold on a larger scale, it could decrease the relative popularity
of tax-embedded antipoverty programs.
The first three hypotheses I have discussed have firm roots in
the literature on the tax-based welfare state. But before leaving
the question of sustaining relative popularity, I want to consider
the possible importance of two additional hypotheses that have
received little to no attention in the literature so far. One pertains
to race. The evidence on why welfare is relatively unpopular,
summed up in Martin Gilens’s Why Americans Hate Welfare,
answers that question exhaustively, and does so with a single
word: Race.40 Americans have a lot of racist stereotypes of welfare
recipients.41 What that literature has not yet probed is the fact that
Americans may have fewer racist stereotypes of recipients of
tax-embedded benefits. In a recent online commentary for
Brookings, researchers Cecile Murray and Elizabeth Kneebone
look not at perceptions but just at the recipient racial breakdown
itself.42 They argue that,
38. Ben
Shapiro,
TWITTER
(Oct.
18,
2018,
6:56
AM),
https://twitter.com/benshapiro/status/1052921391140364288 (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
39. See id. (showing 1,241 retweets and 5,300 likes).
40. See, e.g., Hana Brown, The New Racial Politics of Welfare: Ethno-Racial
Diversity, Immigration, and Welfare Discourse Variation, 87 SOC. SERV. REV. 586,
596, 606 (2013) (discussing welfare discourse); Gilens, supra note 15, at 167, 204–
06, 213–16 (reviewing survey data about racial stereotypes in thinking about
welfare); Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New
Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV., 415, 434–45 (1999)
(discussing racial politics and welfare reform); Martin Gilens, “Race Coding” and
White Opposition to Welfare, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 593, 593–95 (1996) (discussing
attitudes towards welfare).
41. See Gilens, supra note 15, at 173 (“The cynicism that white Americans
express toward welfare recipients is fed by their belief that blacks lack a
commitment to work, in combination with their exaggerated impressions of the
extent to which African Americans populate the country’s welfare rolls”.).
42. See Cecile Murray & Elizabeth Kneebone, The Earned Income Tax Credit
and
the
White
Working
Class,
AVENUE
(Apr.
18,
2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2017/04/18/the-earned-income-taxcredit-and-the-white-working-class/ (discussing the EITC and racial and
educational lines) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
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The EITC should still have bipartisan appeal today because it
reaches across the demographic divides that characterized the
2016 election, particularly those of race and education . . . about
half of all EITC-eligible taxpayers are white. Furthermore,
white taxpayers who do not have a college degree—the so-called
white working class—make up fully 40 percent of all taxpayers
eligible for the EITC. At the same time, the EITC benefits the
black and Latino working class, who combined also account for
40 percent of all taxpayers eligible for the credit.43

The racial breakdown of TANF recipients is a little different: In
2016, 37% of recipients were Hispanic, 29% were black and only
28% were white.44
While most people who answer public opinion polls
presumably could not cite those numbers, many of the
direct-spending antipoverty programs do come with racially
charged historical baggage that the tax credits may lack.45 I am
trying to untangle the race thread in a current survey experiment
of my own, but I have not looked at any of the data yet. Given that
we do not know the extent to which racial stereotyping currently
accounts for the public opinion advantage the tax programs have,
it is even more difficult, though perhaps important, to predict how
possible disparate racial coding of the two programs might change
as the tax programs gain importance in the antipoverty landscape.
The other, and related, hypothesis that the literature has not
explored is that people prefer the tax antipoverty programs to
direct-spending antipoverty programs because any given survey
recipient is much more likely to himself receive a tax-embedded
benefit than a TANF or SNAP payment. This is because not only
do most Americans presumably take some tax benefits, many
middle- and upper-income taxpayers take the very same credits
that are helping lift others out of poverty.46 The best example of
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Tonya L. Brito, supra note 40 (discussing racial politics and welfare
reform).
46. For instance, before TCJA, the child tax credit was available to couples
with AGIs up to $150,000/year, or in the top ten percent of the income distribution
at the time. See Thomas L. Hungerford & Rebecca Thiess, The Earned Income
Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit: History, Purpose, Goals, and Effectiveness,
ECON. POL’Y INST (Sep. 23, 2013), https://www.epi.org/publication/ib370-earned-
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that is of course the child credit, which is not as powerful an
antipoverty tool as the EITC but does have its own substantial role
in lifting families out of poverty.47 After the 2017 tax legislation,
many more families will be taking advantage of that credit.48 If tax
antipoverty programs are popular because they are widely
available, more growth to these programs may in fact enhance,
rather than diminish, their relative popularity.
III. Legal Frameworks
Moving on from relative popularity, the second major, and
possibly persistent, difference between the tax antipoverty
programs and their non-tax counterparts: Their different legal
frameworks. By this I mean the legal consequences of the fact that
tax antipoverty programs are tax law, living in the tax code, and
the direct-spending antipoverty programs are not. This is
something I have written about, but I am especially curious what
others in the room, particularly experts on tax practice and
income-tax-credit-and-the-child-tax-credit-history-purpose-goals-and-effectiveness/
(providing a comprehensive overview of the EITC) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). To take another example, the
child care credit does not have an AGI or other income ceiling, so even the highestincome taxpayers may be eligible for it.
47. The child credit lifted approximately 2.7 million people out of poverty in
2016, including about 1.5 million children and lessened poverty for another 12.3
million people, including 6.1 million children. See Policy Basics: The Child Tax
Credit, CTR. FOR BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/
federal-tax/policy-basics-the-child-tax-credit?fa=view&id=2989 (last visited Feb.
19, 2019) (highlighting the positive effects of the CTC) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). In contrast, the EITC
lifted about 5.8 million people out of poverty, including about 3 million children
and reduced the severity of poverty for another 18.7 million people, including 6.9
million children. See Policy Basics: The Child Tax Credit, CTR. FOR BUDGET&
POLICY PRIORITIES, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-theearned-income-tax-credit (last visited Feb. 19, 2019) (highlighting the positive
effects of the EITC) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
48. Starting in 2018, under TCJA, married taxpayers with a modified AGI
of up to $450,000 will be potentially eligible for the child credit. See Phase Out,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/phaseout.asp (last visited
Feb. 19, 2019) (discussing the phase out for married taxpayers filing jointly) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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procedure, have to say about it. As tax lawyers know well, sections
of the tax code are heavily interlinked.49 Sections of the tax code
reference each other, and some govern many others.50 For instance,
the Code sections on penalties and procedures apply, unless
otherwise specified, to whatever programs live in the Code.51 As a
result, a different set of attendant rules and rights attach to the
tax antipoverty programs than to the non-tax ones.52
To take a couple of examples: One example is the Taxpayer
Bill of Rights, or, really, bills of rights, both the list of ten rights
codified in 2015 and the various pieces of legislation passed in the
1990s.53 These apply, with varying degrees of relevance, to the tax
anti-poverty programs and do not apply at all to their non-tax
counterparts. No corresponding body of federal rights law governs
non-tax programs, most of which depend heavily on state law
anyway. Perhaps for the public-opinion reasons I discussed above,
the history of the non-tax anti-poverty programs has seen a lot of
efforts to take away rights, rather than to build up more of them.54
49. See Tahk (2013), supra note 3, at 88–89; see also STANLEY S. SURREY &
PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 62 (1985).
50. See Tahk (2013), supra note 3, at 89 (discussing the tax code provisions
that cross-reference each other often).
51. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6001 (2018) (requiring “every person liable for tax under
this title, or for the collection thereof” to keep relevant record); id. at 6011
(requiring “[e]very person required to make a return or statement” to provide
required information on that return); id. at 7203 (imposing penalties on “[a]ny
person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by
this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return, keep
any records, or supply any information.”).
52. The above-cited rules only apply to programs governed by the law under
Title 26 of the U.S. Code, where the rules for programs based in the tax code are
found, not to any other programs.
53. See, e.g., Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-647, § 6226, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730 (containing the “Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of
Rights,” known as “TBOR 1”); Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1,
110 Stat. 1452 (1996) (being described as “TBOR 2”); Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3000, 112 Stat. 685,
726 (containing the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, known as “TBOR 3”); Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 401, 129 Stat. 2242, 3117 (2015)
(discussing the “duty to ensure that Internal Revenue Service employees are
familiar with and act in accord with certain taxpayer rights”).
54. See, e.g., Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of
Devolution, 9 GEO J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 89, 125–32 (2002) (discussing the
devolution of TANF and the attempts to strip it of effect); Michele Estrin Gilman,
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Another example, various pieces of recipient-adverse case law
that developed in the context of eroding welfare programs do not
apply to the tax antipoverty programs. For instance, take the law
on “entitlements.” The 1996 welfare legislation specified that while
AFDC had been a federal “entitlement,” TANF would not be.55
Courts have picked up on that language to hold that after welfare
reform, welfare payments are entitled to less robust procedural
due process protections.56 It is true—and I think, possibly legally
important—that the constitutional due process protections
afforded to tax refunds are still unclear, but there is no reason to
think that the particularly unfavorable statutory and case law on
entitlements should apply to them.57
Along similar lines, part of the 1996 welfare statute banned
federally funded legal-services organizations from “participat[ing]
in litigation, lobbying or rulemaking involving an effort to reform
a Federal or State welfare system.”58 Sociologists of public interest
Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 569, 603–
23 (2001) (discussing the degradation of TANF through its privatization); Cynthia
R. Farina, On Misusing “Revolution” and “Reform”: Procedural Due Process and
the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 618–23 (1998) (explaining the
limitations of AFDC and TANF); Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA.
L. REV. 1309, 1337–38 (2012) (highlighting the due process concerns of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996);
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due Process
Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 36 (1997) (explaining how AFDC was
removed and absorbed by TANF).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(b) (West 1997) (“This [legislation] shall not be
interpreted to entitle any individual or family to assistance.”).
56. See, e.g., Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 475–77 (Colo. App. 2001) (“The
federal government may decide not to make funding available to the states for
welfare programs, and may withhold funding from states that fail to follow federal
standards. In either of these situations, individuals expecting welfare benefits
cannot sue the states for benefits not given.”); State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep’t
of Health & Human Res., 575 S.E.2d 393, 402 (W. Va. 2004) (“Therefore, in light
of the specific dictates of the Congress and the [West Virginia] Legislature, we
must reject petitioners' argument that a pre-termination hearing is required
before ending TANF cash assistance due to the expiration of the five-year time
limit.”).
57. See Susannah Camic Tahk, The New Welfare Rights, 83 BROOK. L. REV.
875, 904–05 (2018) (“[T[he refund is, for the purposes of property law [and
procedural due process], more like the salary the taxpayer earned in the first
place than like a benefit that the government later decided to bestow.”).
58. 49 C.F.R. pt. 1639 (1996). For a study of these regulations and their
effects, see Marina Zaloznaya & Laura Beth Nielsen, Mechanisms and
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law have found that, in the words of one of their papers, that
statutory language “drastically reduced the amount of welfare
rights litigation in the United States, causing legal-aid caseloads
to fall by millions of cases and putting hundreds of legal-aid
lawyers out of work.”59 There is no reason I can see, however, that
this rule should apply to many of you in the room, tax lawyers who
represent beneficiaries of tax-embedded social programs. Further,
related to the point I made earlier about how some of the tax
antipoverty programs are approaching near-universal availability,
crafting a provision banning tax lawyers from similar activities
would present some challenges. How would Congress write a law
that says tax lawyers cannot participate in rulemaking for the
child care credit, but they can for the home-mortgage interest
deduction? They cannot for the low-income housing credit, but they
can for the energy tax credits? Those distinctions would rest on
somewhat theoretically shaky grounds and might get pushback
from clients who like having their lawyers represent them in
rulemaking, or from the tax bar itself.60
The legal consequences of being in the tax code may be some
of the most entrenched hallmarks of tax antipoverty policy, and
the ones most likely to endure. As a matter of statute and case law,
of law on the books, while legislators are able to, and have, passed
specific rules that govern particular tax anti-poverty programs, the
default is that the general tax legal framework will apply to
anything in the tax code, and the general welfare—or SNAP, or
Medicaid, or other legal framework—will not.61 Further, as a
matter of law in action, of practical legal dynamics, the tax legal
framework, unlike the welfare legal framework (or the SNAP
framework, or the Medicaid legal framework), continues to develop
Consequences of Professional Marginality: The Case of Poverty Lawyers Revisited,
36 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 919, 925 (2011) (discussing the history of the Legal Services
Corporation); Laura Beth Nielsen & Catherine R. Albiston, The Organization of
Public Interest Law Practice: 1975 – 2004, 84 N.C.L. REV. 1591, 1616–17 (2006)
(same).
59. Zaloznaya & Nielsen, supra note 58, at 925.
60. In addition, as mentioned above, the procedural provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code generally apply to all programs housed within. See I.R.C.
Regulations, supra note 51.
61. See id.
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under circumstances where it affects everyone who interacts with
the tax code, business and nonbusiness, rich and poor.62 That
means that in many situations, the same rules apply to recipients
of tax antipoverty programs as to taxpayers with more resources.63
Taxpayers with more resources then are able to use those
resources to influence how recipient-friendly the tax law becomes.
The example I always used to use was the question of whether the
refundable portion of a refundable credit is itself income. That is
an unresolved issue where well-represented business taxpayers
were presumably hoping to get a taxpayer-favorable answer and
whatever success they had would also apply to poor recipients of
refundable credits.64 Another more recent example is the issue in
the Facebook case about whether the 10-item Taxpayer Bill of
Rights as codified gives rise to substantive legal rights.65 While the
magistrate in that case ruled against Facebook on that issue,66 the
case was still an instance in which a team of paid lawyers from
Baker & McKenzie, working on behalf of Facebook, were arguing
that the Taxpayer Bill of Rights affords taxpayers substantive
protection, as was the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, represented by
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom.67 That argument also has

62. See Tahk, supra note 57, at 900–01 (discussing the ramifications of
Facebook v. I.R.S.).
63. See id. (same).
64. For a discussion of this issue, see Tahk (2013), supra note 3 at 95–98.
65. See generally Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive or Mandamus-Like
Relief, Facebook, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv06490-LB (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017).
66. See generally Order Granting Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction,
Facebook, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv-06490LB (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018).
67. See Facebook’s Opposition to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Facebook, Inc. &
Subsidiaries v. Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv-06490-LB at 10 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 09, 2018) (“A determination that Congress’s codification of TBOR
created substantive taxpayer rights is thus fully consistent with the Supreme
Court’s refusal to read statutes in a manner that renders the language as mere
surplusage [sic].” (citations omitted)); Br. of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America as Amicus Curiae, Facebook, Inc. & Subsidiaries v.
Internal Revenue Serv., Case No. 3:17-cv-06490-LB (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2018)
(“The Taxpayer Bill of Rights guarantees taxpayers the right to appeal a decision
of the Internal Revenue Service . . . .”).
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the potential to help poor taxpayers who receive the EITC or the
premium tax credit or any of the other tax antipoverty programs.
We do see political efforts to carve out the tax antipoverty
provisions and differentiate them from the others, giving them, in
essence, their own law. Most notably the PATH Act of 2015 applied
specifically to some of the tax antipoverty programs, preventing
retroactive claims of the EITC after the issuance of Social Security
numbers and requiring the IRS to hold income tax refunds until
February 15 if the tax return included a claim for the EITC or the
additional child tax credit.68 Will we see more of that? Perhaps as
the tax antipoverty programs become more visible, we will. But the
fact remains that most tax law, specifically most tax procedure, is
not EITC-specific; it’s for every tax benefit. That is a feature of tax
antipoverty programs that may erode over time, but only slowly,
and only with focused legislative intent. In contrast, welfare law is
inherently welfare-specific, SNAP law is inherently SNAP-specific,
and so forth. For this reason, while poverty tax law could, over a
long period of time, become its own area of law, with its own
statutes and case law, it will remain persistently distinct from the
laws that govern the direct-spending programs.
IV. Administration
Third, major, and possibly persistent disparity between the
tax anti-poverty programs and their non-tax counterparts:
Administrative differences. This is an area where I see some real
potential for the paths of the tax and non-tax antipoverty programs
to converge. For reasons I will explain, I do not predict that the
paths will come together completely, but I do see more of a
possibility. Why? While the tax antipoverty programs have
traditionally presented opportunities for administrative
68. See Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-113, §§ 201(b), 204 (2015) (“No credit or refund of an overpayment for a
taxable year shall be made to a taxpayer before the 15th day of the second month
following the close of such taxable year if a credit is allowed to such taxpayer
under section 24 (by reason of subsection (d) thereof) or 32 for such taxable year.”).
For an excellent discussion on the phenomenon of a separate low-income-specific
body of tax law, see generally Leslie Book, U.S. Refundable Credits: The Taxing
Realities of Being Poor, 4 J. TAX ADMIN. 71 (2018).
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efficiencies, enormous federal antipoverty programs can only be so
easy, and so cheap, to administer. Although once upon a time, the
EITC was merely one more line on a tax return, it’s not clear how
feasible it ever was for that to remain the case. In their 2004
article, David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim, in an oft-cited (by me)
line, found that “estimates have put the administrative costs of the
EITC at . . . less than one-tenth the amount spent on the [food
stamp program]. Even at this lower cost, the EITC is substantially
larger than the FSP.”69 They continue, “[n]otwithstanding the
vastly higher administrative and compliance costs of the FSP, it is
not clear that it is any more accurate.”70 With figures like that, the
tax programs looked like a wonderful administrative deal.
However, that deal was perhaps not sustainable, at least for
the tax anti-poverty programs that require individual and family
recipients affirmatively to claim the benefits for which they may
be eligible. As the Taxpayer Advocate wrote in her, the EITC was
“designed to have an easy ‘application’ process by allowing an
individual to claim the benefit on his or her tax return. This
approach dramatically lowered administrative costs, because it did
not require an infrastructure of case workers and local agencies.”71
However, she added, “the easy application process of the EITC is
also associated with a high improper payment rate.”72 In testimony
from 2015, she constructs a measure of program efficiency where
she takes the overhead costs of a variety of direct-spending
antipoverty programs, adds that to the improper payments for
each of those programs, and then takes that figure, overhead plus
improper payments, as a percent of the total benefits the program
pays out.73 That measure, she implies, should tell us something
69. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 3, at 1004.
70. Id.
71. Nat’l Taxpayer Advoc., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2018 61,
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018JRC/JRC18_Volume1_AOF_06.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice).
72. Id.
73. See Written Statement of Nina E. Olson, U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOV’T
OPERATIONS 26 (Apr. 15, 2015) (final row of table listing “overhead costs +
improper payments as a % of total”).
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about the administrative ease of the different programs.74
According to her figures, which do raise some methodological
questions, the EITC, the only tax-based program in the data, is in
the middle of the pack.75 For the EITC, overhead costs plus
improper payments equal 25% of the total benefits paid out.76 For
TANF, that figure is a remarkably similar 24.7%.77 CHIP, the
federal children’s health insurance program, is the worst
performer with a 44% costs plus improper payments figure, and
SNAP, in contrast to the Weisbach and Nussim finding, actually
does the best, with overhead plus improper payments equal to
about 9% of the overall program costs.78
In addition to the improper payments issue, there are take-up
concerns. In the words of economists Saurabh Bhargava and
Dayanand Manoli, who have recently been doing some very
interesting experimental work on the problem, the EITC has “an
estimated incomplete take-up rate of [twenty-five] percent,
amounting to 6.7 million non-claimants each year.”79 They
continue, “[t]he consequences of incomplete take-up can be
significant. The typical EITC non-claimant forgoes an estimated
$1,096, equivalent to [thirty-three] days of income.”80 And, the
authors add, what is more, “[t]hese non-claimants sacrifice other
advantages, such as those related to health, education, or
consumption, that may be linked to transfers” from the tax
credits.81

74. See id. at 27 (“This table demonstrates that for a program of such
significant size, administered at a federal level, the EITC reaches an
extraordinary number and percentage of eligible taxpayers at a modest cost, when
overhead and overclaims are considered together.”)
75. See id. (showing that the 25% figure for the EITC is somewhere in the
middle of the programs listed in the table).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. For the Weisbach & Nussim point, see Weisbach & Nussim, supra
note 3, at 1004.
79. Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Frictions and the
Incomplete Take-up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment,
105 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (2015).
80. Id. at 1–2.
81. Id. at 2.
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In sum, administrative problems with the tax antipoverty
programs have emerged—both regarding take-up and regarding
compliance. It is not an accident that the Taxpayer Advocate
includes EITC issues as one of the most serious problems facing
the IRS in so many of her recent reports.82 For instance, in 2013,
one of the “most serious problems” described in the report was the
fact that, as a response to the perceived overpayments issue, “[t]he
82. See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 91 (2018),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018ARC/ARC18_Volume1.pdf (highlighting the troubles of administering the EITC)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 141 (2017),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017ARC/ARC17_Volume1.pdf (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of
Civil Rights & Social Justice);
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., Annual REP. TO CONGRESS 2015 235, 240, 248, 261 (2015),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Vo
lume1.pdf (same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice);
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 2013 103 (2013),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf
(same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice);
(NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 2011 296 (2011),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2011-annualreport/IRS%20TAS%20ARC%202011%20VOL%201.pdf (same) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., 2007 REP. TO CONGRESS
222 (2007),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/arc_2007_vol_1_cover_msps.pdf (same) (on file with
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC.,
2005 REP.
TO
CONGRESS
94
(2005),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/section_1.pdf (same) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 26 (2003),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_2003_annual_update_mcw_1-15-042.pdf
(same) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., FY2002 ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 36 (2002),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/arc2002_section_one.pdf (same) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., FY2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 26,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2001_tas.pdf (2001) (same) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice);
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC.’S FY2000 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 26 (2000), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub2104-2000.pdf (same) (on
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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IRS [is now] inappropriately ban[ing] many taxpayers from
claiming the EITC.”83 There are several ways in which that may be
true, and in the 2013 report, the Taxpayer Advocate takes as her
main example the Section 32(k) language authorizing the IRS to
ban taxpayers from claiming the EITC for two years if the IRS
determines they claimed the credit improperly, to quote the
statute, “due to reckless or intentional disregard of rules and
regulations.”84 She found that in 2011, “[t]he IRS imposed the ban
improperly almost forty percent of the time . . . [i]n only ten
percent of the cases did a taxpayer’s response to the audit raise the
possibility that he or she had the requisite state of mind to justify
the two-year ban, [i]n [sixty-nine] percent of the cases, the ban was
imposed without required managerial approval and [i]n almost
ninety percent of the cases, neither IRS work papers nor
communications to the taxpayer contained the required
explanation of why the ban was imposed.”85
Another example: In 2015, the Taxpayer Advocate found that
the correspondence audits that the IRS initiates with regard to the
EITC are not working well.86 The IRS expends a lot of resources
auditing the EITC.87 In 2015, EITC audits made up thirty-five
percent of all IRS audits, even though EITC claims were only on
nineteen percent of returns filed.88 The Taxpayer Advocate found
83. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 103 (2013)
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. (2013), supra note 82, at 103 (“The IRS Inappropriately
Bans Many Taxpayers from Claiming EITC.”).
84. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 103 (2013)
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2013-Annual-Report/downloads/Volume-1.pdf
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
85. Id. at 103–04.
86. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 248–60 (2015)
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2015ARC
/ARC15_Volume1.pdf (“The IRS is not adequately using the EITC examination
process as an educational tool and is not auditing returns with the greatest
indirect potential for improving EITC compliance.”) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
87. See generally id.
88. See id. at 249 (“In fact, EITC audits make up [thirty-five] percent of all
IRS audits despite the fact that EITC returns account for only nineteen percent
of all returns filed.”).
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that these audits have a no-response rate of forty percent.89 That
means that in many of these cases, the audited individual very well
might have a defense and simply does not attempt to offer it,
probably due to a lack of understanding about what a defense
might be and about how to assert it. Without ever finding out if
that is true, the IRS goes ahead and assesses the tax and any
penalties, possibly violating a number of now statutorily enshrined
taxpayer rights.90 The correspondence audit process may not cost
as much as actual administrative hearings, but it is not clear that
it is arriving at the right answers.
All of this is to say that the initial picture of the tax system as
a miraculously cheap and accurate way to deliver benefits has
become more complicated as the tax antipoverty programs have
become bigger and more widely available. This is not a surprise.
The tension between accuracy and cost is inherent to disbursing
government benefits, even on a small scale. As the programs
themselves scale up, so too does the tension.
On the other hand, both the government and academic
researchers are working to find ways to improve administration of
tax benefits, the EITC in particular. This new research offers
low-cost opportunities to improve administrative problems like
take-up and noncompliance.
What is notable about many of these suggestions for
improvement is that they rely on efficiencies built into the tax
system. For instance, in the Bhargava and Manoli paper, the two
economists find, using a field experiment, that merely sending
reminder notices to potential EITC claimants significantly
increases take-up.91 In particular, eligible individuals were
substantially more likely to claim the EITC when they received a
reminder notice that was, in contrast to the standard IRS notice,
89. See id. (“The EITC audit program has a no-response rate of over [forty]
percent . . . .”).
90. See id. at 252 (“Moreover, a collection strategy based on ignorance and
guesswork increases the risk of taking collection actions that are more intrusive
than necessary, thereby undermining taxpayer trust in the system and
undermining taxpayers’ right to privacy.”).
91. See Bhargava & Manoli, supra note 79, at 32 (“For example, we estimate
that the mere distribution of a second mailing, approximately similar to the first
reminder notice, would result in an addition 45,000 claimants . . . .”).
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“single-sided, featured a larger and more readable font and a
prominent headline” and came with a claim worksheet that was
non-repetitive and with a cleaner layout and a different font.92
Take-up rates also substantially went up when eligible individuals
received information on a mailer about how big their EITC benefit
could in fact be.93 The EITC never had a big a take-up problem as
the non-tax antipoverty programs (the EITC participation rate
among eligible claimants is about seventy-five percent, as opposed
to forty-two percent for TANF, fifty-five percent for SNAP and
forty-six percent for the oft-scapegoated SSI).94 But this new
research is showing that the IRS can make major strides to address
even its smaller EITC take-up problem merely by changing the
font and layout of its mailers.95 The relatively efficient process
where recipients claim their benefits simply by mailing a form, as
it turns out, is also relatively easy to improve.
Similarly, the Taxpayer Advocate has used experiments to
show the possible large effects of relatively low-cost administrative
fixes on the compliance front.96 For example, she found in her
research, that EITC compliance went up substantially when her
office sent a letter to previously noncompliant EITC claimants that
“explained the requirements for claiming EITC in plain language,
identified the specific requirement the recipient [had not]
appear[ed] to meet [in the past], and suggested sources of
additional information and assistance, including the Taxpayer
Advocate Service itself.”97 Then, she also found that when her office
offered, in the same letter, the number for a dedicated “Extra Help”
telephone line “staffed by TAS employees trained to answer
92. Id. at 12.
93. See id. at 21 (“Among treatments that provided information, the display
of benefit information was the most potent.”).
94. See id. at 8 (“A recent analysis by the IRS based on data for TY 2005,
which informs assumptions used in this study, suggests an overall program
uptake rate of [seventy-five] percent . . . .”).
95. See id. at 17 (“The comparison suggest a large net positive effect of
simplification on response . . . as well as of information . . . .”).
96. See generally id.
97. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 15 (2017),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/ResearchStudies/AR
C17_Volume2_02_StudySubsequent.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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taxpayer questions about the letter and the EITC eligibility
rules,”98 compliance increased even further.99 Staffing a help line
and sending an additional letter are not free, but again, they are
relatively low-cost interventions that, according to Taxpayer
Advocate data, have the possibility, taken together, to reduce
erroneous EITC claims by about $75 million a year.100 Both of them
take advantage of the relatively streamlined system by which
people make EITC overclaims in the first place to introduce
features that can substantially reduce those claims.101 Given that
the application for most of the direct-spending programs was
always more complex, it is hard to imagine equally cost-effective
interventions that could as substantially reduce corresponding
problems in those programs.
Taking all of this together, possible changes to public opinion,
to the law itself, and to tax administration, the answer to whether
the trajectories of tax anti-poverty programs and their non-tax
counterparts will converge turns out, unsurprisingly, to be
complicated. I hope that future research on some of these questions
can help us to understand, and in fact to shape, these trajectories,
and I am looking forward to seeing many of the people in this room
conduct that research in the years to come.
V. Normative Concerns
Before concluding, I want to put aside for a minute the positive
question of whether the future of the tax anti-poverty programs
98. NTA Blog: TAS Research Shows that Education Improves EITC
Compliance,
TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE
SERV.
(Sept.
20,
2018),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-tas-research-shows-thateducation-improves-eitc-compliance (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
99. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 91, 102 (2018),
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2018ARC/ARC18_Volume2.pdf (giving the results of this experiment) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
100. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., supra note 97, at 14, 15.
101. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., ANNUAL REPORT 91, 93 n.17 (2018) (defining
“overclaims” as “the difference between the amount of EITC claimed by the
taxpayer on his or her return and the amount the taxpayer should have claimed”)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).

490

25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 465 (2019)

will converge with the story of the direct spending programs. I am
going to turn to the normative question: Insofar as they do
converge, is that necessarily bad?
The easy answer to this question, and the one implicit in most
of this talk so far, is yes. After all, from a political perspective, the
big federal welfare program, AFDC, was unpopular and for this
reason, eventually repealed.102 Its successor is smaller and for that
reason, less adept at reducing the poverty rate.103 Scholars have
also exhaustively documented how, even when AFDC existed, it
was the lower tier in a racialized two-tiered welfare state.104
Recipients found it user-unfriendly and also stigmatizing.105 From
a legal perspective, poverty lawyers seem to agree that the body of
law that developed around AFDC and TANF, and also around
some of the other direct-spending anti-poverty programs, was full
of recipient-adverse decisions and statutes that placed major
hurdles in advocates’ paths.106 From an administrative
102. See supra Part I.
103. See Scholz et al., supra note 1, at 220–21 (showing in a graph the effect
of transfers on poverty).
104. See, e.g., Karen M. Suzanne Mettler, The Stratification of Social
Citizenship: Gender and Federalism in the Formation of Old Age Insurance and
Aid to Dependent Children, 11 J. OF POL’Y HIST. 31, 31 (1999) (arguing that social
citizenship became organized as a two-tiered system in terms of gender due to
“political battles over the proper institutional arrangements for program
administration”); Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Social Citizenship by Gender: The
Implementation of Unemployment Insurance and Aid to Dependent Children,
1935–1950, 12 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 303, 303 (1998) (noting that the American
welfare state emerged as “two-tiered” or “two-track” in character, which divided
American social citizenship by gender); Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before
the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314, 318 n.12
(2012) (noting that in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972), the Supreme
Court “found no equal protection violation in a state law that set lower level
benefits for AFDC recipients than for recipients of other need-based assistance
programs”). See generally Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizenship, in DIVIDING
CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998); NANCY
FRASER, UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE, AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL THEORY (1989).
105. See Jennifer Sykes et al., Dignity and Dreams: What the Earned Income
Tax Credit (EITC) Means to Low-Income Families, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 243, 258–59
(2015) (explaining a single mother’s concern that welfare recipients “‘just sit on
welfare’” (citations omitted)).
106. See, e.g., Tani, supra note 104, at 381, 125–57; Cimini, supra note 54, at
125–32 (explaining how devolving policymaking to county and local officials risks
the enforcement of procedural due process rights for TANF recipients); Tani,
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perspective, it imposed substantial administrative burden.107 As
students of and participants in the tax system, we probably do not
want any of that.
However, a few complications to the normative question. First,
the voices most critical of the tax antipoverty programs focus on
overpayments.108 In calling for more guardrails against them, they
are in fact envisioning a system that’s more like welfare, in which
there are different and stricter rules for poorer recipients. The IRS
is moving in that direction with its high EITC audit rate and
increasingly multilayered processing of EITC claims.109 AFDC and
TANF have never been perfect at reducing overpayments, and
certainly complaints about welfare fraud were and remain
common.110 However, direct-spending programs—perhaps because
they are unpopular—have traditionally been more comfortable
erecting barriers to participation so as to risk fewer
overpayments.111 I prefer the tradeoff that the tax programs make:
supra note 104, at 381 (“Critics have long alleged that when benefits come with
rights, or are packaged as rights, policymakers lose flexibility, taxpayers suffer,
and the poor lose incentive to work.”).
107. See Donald Moynihan et al., Administrative Burden: Learning,
Psychological, and Compliance Costs in Citizen-State Interactions, 25 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 43, 44 (2015) (explaining how administrative burden in
AFDC and TANF have reduced participation).
108. See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, The $16 Billion Tax-Credit Black Hole, NAT’L
REV. (June 1, 2016), https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/06/eitc-fraudhonduran-scammers-steal-millions/ (arguing that the EITC “has ballooned into a
massive welfare entitlement” to those who do not pay taxes) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); Chris Edwards &
Veronique de Rugy, Earned Income Tax Credit: Small Benefits, Large Costs, CATO
INST.
TAX
&
BUDGET
BULLETIN
73
(Oct.
14,
2015),
https://www.cato.org/publications/tax-budget-bulletin/earned-income-tax-creditsmall-benefits-large-costs (arguing that the EITC “has a high error and fraud
rate” and “creates a disincentive to increase earnings”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
109. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOC., supra note 71, at 100 (suggesting that an
affidavit be incorporated into the EITC audit process for a taxpayer to use for
substantiating his or her claim to help reduce improper payment rate); Leslie
Book, U.S. Refundable Credits: The Taxing Realities of Being Poor, 4 J. OF TAX
ADMIN. 71, 80 (2018) (noting that program complexity is a “main driver of error”).
110. For a discussion of public perceptions of welfare fraud, see Gilens, supra
note 15, at 63–64.
111. See Evelyn Z. Brodkin & Malay Majmundar, Administrative Exclusion:
Organizations and the Hidden Costs of Welfare Claiming, 20 J. of PUB. ADMIN.
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Easier access at the risk of more overpayments, but some might
reasonably prefer a different one.
Then, I am so happy this conference includes a panel on
universal basic income alternatives, because I want to talk for a
minute about universality. Many of the most persistent
advantages that the tax anti-poverty programs may have persisted
because the tax system is so universal.112 Why might the tax
programs’ relative popularity endure? At least in part because so
many people get tax benefits. Even rich, white people get tax
benefits. Why do the law governing tax programs remain so
different from the law governing non-tax programs? Because that
law applies to all taxpayers, not just EITC recipients.113 Why is the
tax administrative apparatus relatively easy to fix? Because the
same low-cost, non-stigmatizing application process, return filing
applies to everybody.114
I have argued in my written work, and will happily continue
to argue, that the universality of the tax antipoverty programs is
not just the source of their most enduring features, but one of their
best.115 Universality explains much of their success. Also, the
vision of equal treatment of everyone in the U.S. standing before
the same tax law, is one that holds enormous normative appeal for
me. Participating in the tax system implies membership in the
group collecting the taxes, in another word, citizenship.116 As Larry
Zelenak has written, the act of filing a tax return is a form of active
civic participation that implies a willingness to assume the
responsibilities as well as the benefits of membership in a political
community.117 Using tax returns as the means by which
RES. AND THEORY 827, 842 (2010) (discussing administrative barriers in the TANF
context); Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 3, at 1001 (discussing administrative
barriers in the food stamps context).
112. See supra Part I.
113. See supra Part II.
114. See supra Part III.
115. See Tahk, supra note 3, at 98–101 (arguing that the universality of the
tax system fosters the inclusion of often times marginalized groups).
116. See id. at 99 (“Assuming the mantle of a taxpayer arguably confers on
the recipient the sense that he or she is a stakeholder in the government that
collects the taxes.”).
117. See Lawrence Zelenak, Justice Holmes, Ralph Kramden, and the Civic
Virtues of a Tax Return Filing Requirement, 61 TAX L. REV. 53, 61 (2007)
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low-income people claim benefits allows them too to participate in
this civic ritual and symbolically claim the associated
responsibilities and rights of citizenship, placing them on equal
footing with all the other participants.118
Conversely, citizenship is a troublingly exclusive concept,
historically tied to membership in a dominant elite, defined by
class, gender, and race.119 While using the tax code for antipoverty
policy expands the definition of who gets to belong to the political
community of citizens, tax-based social policy still implicates that
fundamentally exclusive concept and implies that people who,
often by reason of income or race or other disadvantage, do not
qualify to participate, also do not deserve benefits. As a result, we
are missing a program that’s actually targeted at including the
excluded. That leaves a hole in the social-policy landscape.
Welfare and other direct-spending antipoverty programs, are
tailored, for better or worse, toward the genuinely disadvantaged
in this country.120 Benefits were available not as part of a quid pro
quo for active citizenship, but because the U.S. decided that it
should give particular help to people of particular need.121 The way
to qualify for direct-spending anti-poverty programs was to
demonstrate need. The fact that welfare is not universal and is
instead targeted at people outside of the U.S. dominant race and
class is arguably why welfare became unpopular, and why legal
and political elites were so determined to erect legal and
administrative barriers to entry. The U.S. replaced it with tax
(referring to tax return filing “as a valuable civic ceremony should be attractive
to those who subscribe to a fairly wide range of republican or liberal political
theories.”).
118. See id. (“The filing requirement also promotes the goal of political
equality . . . by recognizing and formalizing the status of each tax return filer as
a taxpayer—whether her tax liability happens to be $1 or $1 million.”).
119. Discussion of this point has been going on for millennia, but for two
recent examples in the U.S. context, see Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America,
Equal Citizenship and the Constitution, 43–49 (1989); Eileen Boris, The
Racialized Gendered State: Constructions of Citizenship in the United States, 5
SOC. POL. 160, 165 (1998).
120. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601 2018 (“The purpose of this part is to increase
the flexibility of States in operating a program designed to . . . provide assistance
to needy families . . . .”).
121. See id. (same).
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anti-poverty programs that are more popular, and legally and
administratively more user-friendly perhaps because they are not
tailored toward the most disadvantaged.
That raises several practical problems for the tax antipoverty
programs. For one, the US has plenty of people living in extreme
poverty who need help and are not getting it from these
programs.122 For another, the tax-based social welfare programs
distribute massive benefits to people who are not in fact in need.123
Through these programs, the government is expending substantial
resources on benefits for middle- and upper-income individuals124.
If the cost of an antipoverty program really now has to include
major outlays on the nonpoor, that makes these programs much
more expensive to run. On a moral rather than a practical level, I
also find it disquieting to note that the U.S. is particularly willing
and able to support a social-policy apparatus when it is not
explicitly targeted toward the people most in need, many of whom
are quite different in identity from the white middle-income voters
who answer public opinion polls and the politicians who represent
them. Directing low-income people through the tax return process
to claim benefits may reassure members of dominant groups:
Low-income people, they are just like us! But our goal as a society,
I think, should be to offer relief even to people who are not like us.
The race angle perhaps puts the problem into starkest relief.
The rise of the tax antipoverty programs and the fall of
direct-spending programs means the fall of programs that racial
groups take advantage of in equal measure and the rise of
programs that are majority white.125 But I can put the same
122. See Tahk, supra note 3, at 839 (discussing work requirements that
accompany certain antipoverty provisions, which prevent many families in
extreme poverty from benefiting from these tax programs).
123. See What is the Child Tax Credit?, TAX POL’Y CTR.,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-child-tax-credit (last visited
Mar. 1, 2019) (stating that the families receiving the Child Tax Credit are highest
among moderate and middle income families, and that the proportion of families
in the highest income quintile receiving the CTC is 87%) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
124. See id. (stating that families in the lowest income quintile are less likely
to benefit for the child tax credit than middle- and high-income families).
125. See Murray & Kneebone, supra note 42 (showing that about half of EITC
eligible taxpayers are white).
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problem in economic terms: We took away a program that was for
low-income people and replaced it with programs that are
available across the income ladder. As a practical result, some of
the most disadvantaged members of U.S. society materially lose
out, because they do not qualify for the tax antipoverty
programs.126 Even if we could – and as I have argued elsewhere,
should—refine the tax antipoverty programs so that they reach
even Americans with very low incomes, to the extent the
increasingly tax-based U.S. social policy landscape continues to
diverge from traditional welfare programs, the discourse around it
reduces the salience of many of the U.S.’s most marginalized
people and elides the question of what we as a society might owe
them.127
Then, to take a different normative question, how do these
predictions about the future of tax anti-poverty policy affect what
we do, as scholars and also as advocates, for clients sometimes, and
also for a better system? I am not the most experienced scholar or
advocate in the room, so I have more to learn from you than you
from me. All I want to say is that the long-range perspective
remains important. While, the direct-spending programs often
serve as a negative foil in my work, one of the best moments I have
had as a researcher was a fall morning two Octobers ago this year,
reading about the history of the welfare-rights movement, and how
the grassroots activists and lawyers behind that movement
attempted to use their cases, and their systemic advocacy to
enshrine in case law their robust view of social citizenship.128 They
started with the problems of the poorest welfare recipients and
from there, developed a fully imagined picture of a legal system
dedicated to protecting social and economic rights.129 A lot of what
the welfare rights movement did was not successful, and we might
126. See Tahk, supra note 3, at 839 (stating that many of the most extreme
impoverished families are prevented from taking advantage of tax antipoverty
programs due the fact that taxpayers who do not work often do not file tax
returns).
127. See id. (“[T]o this day, the tax war on poverty has not seriously attempted
to tackle deep poverty, and lawmakers should start to step into this gap.”).
128. See generally MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE
WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1960–1973 (1993).
129. See generally id.
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not agree with everything it tried to accomplish. But today, still
near the beginning of what I predict will be the tax code’s long
antipoverty history, we have the opportunity, as the welfare rights
advocates did, to shape the long-term futures of the programs we
care about, to avoid the pitfalls of the direct-spending programs,
and to use all of this work to make major changes not just to the
workings of these programs, but to concepts foundational to the
legal system.

